

THE CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM:
IMPACT OF HUNGARIAN EVENTS ON THE MOVEMENT OUTSIDE THE BLOC

11 February 1957

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Introduction

1. The Hungarian crisis had a number of important consequences for the international movement--
 - a. A drive to enforce Soviet leadership in the movement, to suppress deviationism, to renew the attack on Tito in order to sterilize his influence in the movement, to get clear-cut Chinese Communist backing for Moscow's leadership and to establish some kind of machinery for more effective international coordination.
 - b. Some difficulties for the "peaceful coexistence" strategy, particularly in the promotion of Asian "neutralism".
 - c. Setbacks for the movement in Western Europe, expressed in terms of loss of popular support, membership losses and defections of prominent intellectual fellow-travellers and some Party cadres, in terms of disagreement within the Party leaderships and apathy among the ranks. The united front drive has been reduced to empty and ineffectual propaganda, at least for the moment. The Social Democrats were strengthened vis-a-vis the Communists and the Soviet effort to promote united fronts and/or to gain influence by way of exchange delegations was set back.
 - d. Less important effects in Latin America, where there were minor anti-Soviet manifestations and some evidences of confusion in the CP's in the early stages.
 - e. Dissension in some of the international Communist fronts.
 - f. Steps to re-consolidate the Western alliance, and the decision of the Icelandic Government to continue the U.S. defense arrangement.

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2. In the following paragraphs an attempt is made to analyze and summarize the impact of the Hungarian crisis on popular opinion and the Communist movement, region by region.
3. An appendix gives details on a country basis. The information in the appendix is from various sources, including the press.
4. It would be appreciated if recipients of this survey would provide comments and any significant additional information available to them.

Western Europe

5. In Western Europe, where popular revulsion against the Soviet action was more intense than elsewhere, and in some instances violent (raids on CP offices, attacks on CP leaders), the movement suffered a definite setback in terms of popular support, Party membership, and internal unity. The small West European CP's are even more isolated and smaller than before. The big French and Italian CP's have also suffered. It is not yet possible to assess the full significance of this set-back, for a number of reasons--

- a. Estimates of membership losses to date are not firm. The CP's themselves probably have not yet been able to calculate them.
- b. Many Party members who are directly opposed to the leadership are staying in, hoping to bring pressure on the leadership for a change in policy and/or to achieve a change in the leadership. The ultimate fate of these oppositionists cannot be known for many months.
- c. Many disaffected members are simply dropping into inaction and more may do so in the future. The leadership may continue to carry them on the membership rolls for a long period, partly in the hope that they can be reactivated, partly to avoid further demoralization by revealing the losses.
- d. Some "Stalinist" types are renewing Party activity following a period of alienation.

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e. The successive shocks of the year undoubtedly renewed the thinking process in some staunch Communists, and they may not be willing in the long run to submit to the reimposition of hard discipline: i.e., the defection process may be gradual, as in the case of Belgian Communist Van Hoorick, who waited for two months before making up his mind.

f. The self-delusive tendencies of pro-Communist intellectuals should never be underestimated: some of them are already having qualms and may return to the movement.

g. Evidences to date of losses in popular support (local elections, trade union elections, other actions calling upon non-Party people for support) are only suggestive, not conclusive.

The small CP's

6. In Denmark, the Party has had substantial defections, mainly on the local level and among the intellectuals, both in the Party itself and on its fringes. It has also experienced serious internal dissension, the outcome of which is still in doubt. The Norwegian CP has had some defections and has expressed criticism of the USSR, but has lost no top leaders, and appears to remain under control. The Swedish Communist front organizations have lost members, but the CP itself has not been noticeably hurt. The Finnish Social Democratic press claims that there is substantial dissension in the FCP. In Iceland, where the intensity of the popular reaction against the USSR was unusual for that country, the CP has lost part of its hold over labor, and suffered a setback in its drive to expel U.S. forces. The Dutch CP has been financially hurt by loss of subscriptions and advertizing contracts to its press, but there have been no large-scale defections from the Party. The Communist labor federation in Holland (EVC), however, has suffered heavy losses. In Switzerland, on the other hand, there were substantial defections with Party sections resigning en bloc and a number of prominent Communists quitting. The British CP has also suffered heavily, with numerous intellectuals, trade unionists and local Party leaders resigning. Although British Party leader Gollan predicted a membership loss of only about 3%, the caliber of the defectors makes this loss rather significant.

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The Belgian CP experienced some leadership disagreements, and has escaped any large-scale defections, but former Politburo member Bert Van Hoorick went over to the Socialists in January 1957. Drapeau Rouge Magazine No. 3 (19-25 January 1957), in commenting on the case, adopted a tone of regret and sought to blur the issue by attacking the Socialist Party. The latter's newspaper predicted that Van Hoorick would soon feel obliged to take a more openly vigorous stand against the Party. The Austrian CP was particularly hard-hit by the Hungarian crisis. The national leadership was torn by dissension, with Ernst Fischer declaring that "at no other time has any other event hurt us so deeply, nor has any event shaken our conscience so painfully as the Hungarian tragedy." This crisis extended down into the provincial organizations. Nevertheless, despite this dissension and the defection of several intellectuals and local labor leaders, the Austrian Party has officially taken a firmly pro-Soviet, anti-deviationist position.

7. In brief, among the smaller West European CP's those that have exhibited the most serious overt signs of internal crisis to date are the British, Danish, Swiss, and Austrian. The Icelandic CP has suffered a serious strategic set-back.

The big CP's

8. The Hungarian events hit the French and Italian CP's in rather different ways. CP France suffered mostly on the periphery, with the spectacular defections of fellow-traveling intellectuals (some of whom have since returned to the fold) and with at least a temporary revolt by units of the CGT. The Party apparatus as a whole, however, always highly disciplined and tightly controlled by Maurice Thorez, seems on the surface to have been relatively unaffected by the Hungarian crisis. Thorez steered a firmly pro-Soviet orthodox course throughout the crisis year of 1956. He spearheaded the Soviet attack on Tito in November and against the deviations in Poland. The French-Czech Party discussions in January demonstrated the re-consolidation of the Bolshevik CP's under Moscow leadership.

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9. The Italian CP, on the other hand, which was never so tightly disciplined as the French Party, experienced significant internal dissension and has had a number of important defections, particularly from its press apparatus. The most important break was made by former Senator Eugenio Reale, who was expelled for publicizing his opposition to the leadership and its record on Hungary. Togliatti, who was partly to blame for the internal ferment in the Party, (as well as in the international movement), has sought to re-establish discipline and to re-affirm international solidarity. By adroit "rigging" of the Party Congress and of the leadership apparatus, he appears to have maintained his control over the apparatus, even though the elections to the Central Committee showed that his personal popularity within the Party had suffered.

10. Both the French and Italian CP's have lost members. No firm figures on the PCF losses are available,* but about 30 percent of the members of the PCI, according to a public admission by Amendola at the January Central Committee meeting, have failed to renew their membership (current strength: 1,449,000). Both Parties experienced a period of aimlessness, apathy and inactivity within their ranks, and insofar as it is measurable, both have lost some political strength.

* Sartre has claimed that the Party has only about 180,000 members. It is believed, however, that this figure is much too small, and that membership has not fallen below 300,000. At the 14th Party Congress last July, Organization secretary Servin claimed that 429,653 membership cards had been "delivered" to the Federations. On the face of it, this would indicate a loss of about 30%, but the ambiguities involved in the comparative estimates prevent us from arriving at any reasonably accurate figure. France-Soir of 28 November said that at the 20-21 November CC meeting, Servin had announced a total of 562 resignations in a report that was not intended for publication. (The accounts of Servin's report published in the Party press reflected nothing but great gains, expressed in carefully relative terms.) Perhaps the France-Soir estimate is somewhat nearer the truth than some of the others.

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11. The impact of the Hungarian events on the "united front" line of the two CP's differed. Despite its official line on the subject, the French CP has failed to develop an effective approach to the Socialists and may never have entertained any serious hopes for the achievement of a "popular front." In Italy, on the other hand, Togliatti's policy for many years has really been aimed at the formation of a broad left-wing front, consisting of PCI, PSI, PSDI and the left-wing of the Christian Democrats, and at a "parliamentary transition to Socialism." Thus, Togliatti encouraged the steps taken last summer to re-unify the PSI and PSDI.

But PSI leader Pietro Nenni, who broke sharply with the USSR over the Stalin question, has continued to move further away from the PCI. There is a substantial pro-Communist faction in the PSI leadership, but the hand of the anti-Communist faction has undoubtedly been strengthened by the Hungarian crisis. At the moment, the outcome of this complicated political struggle is in suspense. Nenni renounced his 1952 Stalin Peace Prize and turned over a large sum to the Italian Red Cross (i.e., for Hungarian relief) and other charities. French Socialist leader Pierre Commin is back in Italy to push PSI-PSDI reunification efforts. On 20 January 1957, Togliatti made a speech promising to support PSI leaders who would oppose reunification. His references to "shameful capitulation" and the priority of "the class struggle", as carried by the Italian news service ANSA, suggest that he fears that the possibility of the PCI's being isolated by a PSI-PSDI unification is a definite prospect and that he is calling for a split in the PSI itself. If so, this would mark a definite change in PCI strategy.

12. In addition to this apparent tightening up of PCI policies on the local scene, there have been indications that Togliatti has gone over to a position favoring closer international coordination of the Communist movement. He says that he opposes any "centralized" international organization, but in the nature of things some centralization could not be avoided.

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13. In conclusion, it is emphasized that the setbacks experienced by the French and Italian CP's, while serious, should not be regarded as fatal. They have lost ground in popular support, in membership, and have experienced significant dissension, either in the periphery or in the Party itself. But they remain strong organizations with significant mass followings, and it is always possible that they can recoup their losses in an economic decline.

Asia

14. Asian preoccupation with the Egyptian crisis tended at first to distract attention from the Soviet action in Hungary. Indignation over the Anglo-French attack on Egypt tempered Asian reactions to the Hungarian events with a feeling that Russian behavior was no worse than that of the West. Condemnation of Soviet action in Hungary was delayed and blunted by these feelings. Since the Middle Eastern crisis has been somewhat ameliorated, Asian countries have been able to give more attention to Hungary. Consistently, however, Asians have tended to associate the two events and to mention the Middle East whenever speaking of Hungary.

15. Although widespread unofficial and press criticism of the Soviet move quickly developed throughout Asia, governments and official spokesmen were slow to commit themselves to an anti-Soviet stand. On the first United Nations proposals for censure of the Russians the Afro-Asian bloc generally abstained or voted with the Soviet bloc, although Cambodia, Thailand and the Philippines supported the West. This was perhaps due to a reluctance to appear to take sides between East and West. The Indonesian Foreign Minister and the Burmese United Nations delegate justified their stands by the claim that they did not have complete information on events in Hungary, a position which the Indian Prime Minister Nehru also used on a number of public occasions where he was called upon to comment on Hungary. None of the non-Communist Asian nations, however, undertook to defend the Soviet action.

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16. The support of the Indian delegates for the Soviet Union in the first United Nations debates on Hungary provoked strong criticism in India and abroad. This may have been in part responsible for Nehru's statement in which he declared that freedom had been "outraged" by the Soviet action. The Indian reaction also suggests that Chou En-lai's recent trip through that area would have been more successful if China had not unequivocally supported the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt.
17. On the final United Nations resolution condemning Soviet aggression in Hungary, the Asian neutralist bloc had moved closer to the Western position, with Burma and Ceylon supporting the Western position, and India and Indonesia abstaining.
18. International consultation among Asian countries also took place during the period of the crises in Egypt and Hungary. Prime Ministers of four of the Colombo powers, India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia, meeting in mid-November, issued a mildly critical statement concerning the Soviet intervention in Hungary. The Asian Socialist Conference, which was in Bombay during the first week of November, and which includes the leaders of Governments in Burma, Israel and Ceylon, passed a strong resolution condemning the Russian use of troops in Hungary. Although there was dispute over the language of the resolution, no member of the conference opposed the basic principle. It is significant that Socialist opposition parties in India and Indonesia concurred strongly with the Socialist Government leaders of Burma, Ceylon and Israel in the Asian Socialist Conference resolution.
19. Government spokesmen in several Asian countries made statements censuring the Soviet action. Prime Minister Nehru's statement on November 19 was perhaps the most significant in indicating a greater sensitivity in Asia to Communist imperialism, although Prime Minister Ba Swe of Burma spoke out sooner and in stronger terms at the Asian Socialist Conference on 4 November when he accused the Soviet Union of attempting to "scuttle the United Nations." Under pressure from all political parties except the Communists, from the press and from public opinion, the Indonesian Government on 8 November made a statement "regretting the involvement of troops of the Soviet Union in

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Hungary." Foreign Minister Abdulgani qualified this resolution further in his statement to Parliament on 13 November warning that this "resolution could easily be made into a tool to transfer world attention from a more serious issue, namely the British-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt." On 20 December, Abdulgani again criticized the Soviet military intervention in Hungary, but coupled this with a warning against "meddling by any country, through agitation among the Hungarian people or otherwise." This warning was presumably aimed against the United States. The Government, in these statements and in other actions, clearly seeks to avoid having to take an unequivocal stand which would compromise its "neutrality."

20. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu of Japan, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia and President Diem of South Vietnam also issued public statements strongly criticizing the Soviet aggression in Hungary. South Korea even offered volunteers for Hungary.

21. Asian public opinion, like the views of Asian leaders, has been preoccupied with the Egyptian question and there has been relatively little popular expression of indignation over Hungary. Demonstrators in Pakistan did include Russia with France and Britain as objects of their anger. Attempts to organize anti-Russian demonstrations in Indonesia were forbidden by the Government, although violent outbursts against France and Britain had been encouraged. The Islamic and Socialist Youth organizations in Jakarta organized a "Committee Against Soviet Colonialist Intervention" in late November, and the Indonesian Red Cross appealed for aid for the Hungarian people as well as for the Egyptians. Public rallies to organize sentiment against the Russian action and for aid to Hungary took place in Saigon, Manila and Tokyo. Press criticism of the Russian intervention in Hungary has been strong in Japan, Indonesia and Burma.

22. Communist Party leadership throughout the area has said nothing to conflict with the Soviet line on Hungary. The statements which have been made in India, particularly, have paralleled to some extent the views expressed by Marshal Tito during the early stages of the crisis, deploring the bloodshed and blaming the mistakes of the Hungarian

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Communist leadership. Indonesian Party statements have followed more closely the Soviet line that the Hungarian revolt was engineered by U.S. "imperialists." The Hungarian crisis has had little impact on PKI leaders, who do not question the Soviet "explanations". The Australian CP showed no signs of significant internal dissension, and Party leader L. L. Sharkey showed, in an attack on the Gates faction of the CPUSA (Tribune, 28 November) that he had no ideological differences with Moscow.

23. It is too early to make any predictions as to the long-range effects, but there have been several authoritative reports of discontent of rank-and-file Party members with the Soviet action in Hungary. The Japanese Party has openly admitted to some "confusion" within its ranks, and two Communist front organizations, the Japanese chapter of the Asian Solidarity Committee and the Japanese Committee for Peace, have issued statements deploring the Soviet action. In New Zealand, the defection of Party theoretician Sid Scott suggests that dissension exists in the CP, even though it has not come into the open to any appreciable extent. Indian Communist leader Ajoy Ghosh has also publicly deplored the bloodshed in Hungary. Although Ghosh managed to avoid the question of alleged American "intervention", E. M. S. Namboodripad made this charge explicit. In the Middle East the Hungarian events have had no discernible effects on the Communist movement which, except in Israel, has continued to make gains and has been able to capitalize on the Egyptian crisis.

Latin America

24. Soviet action in Hungary led to minor anti-Soviet, anti-Communist manifestations in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Uruguay. Catholic organizations and local Hungarian and Polish immigrant groups were active in these demonstrations. The non-Communist press throughout the area adopted strongly anti-Soviet positions although in some countries, particularly in the early stages, reaction against the Soviet action was diverted by critical reaction against Anglo-French action in Egypt. The Argentine Government seized upon the Hungarian crisis to act against the Argentine CP, and in other Latin American countries government spokesmen and political leaders attacked the Soviet action.

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25. Despite some evidence of disorientation in the leadership and of confusion among the ranks of a few of the Latin American CP's, they seem to have been relatively untouched by the Hungarian events. A few deviant articles appeared in the Brazilian Communist paper, but they were soon followed by strictly pro-Soviet articles, and on 20 November the paper carried a stiff letter by Party leader Prestes, cracking down on the loose discussion over Stalin and calling for "iron discipline" and "proletarian internationalism" in support of the CPSU. The Communist press in Chile, Costa Rica and Ecuador also adopted firmly pro-Soviet positions, as did Lombardo Toledano in Mexico.

26. The few indications of even minor setbacks for Latin American Communism include these:

- a. The action of the Argentine Government.
- b. A disagreement in the leadership of the pro-Communist Chilean labor central, CUTCH.
- c. A protest resolution adopted by the Ecuadoran University Students' Federation, an affiliate of the international Communist front, IUS.
- d. A decision of the Socialist-oriented, but apolitical, labor federation, CSU, in Uruguay against cooperating with a Communist trade union instrumentality.
- e. In Costa Rica, a prominent pro-Communist women's leader renounced her Soviet sympathies.

27. On the other side of the coin, it is of some interest to note that, after a month of silence, Chilean poet Pablo Neruda flatly rejected an appeal from the Congress of Cultural Freedom to join French intellectuals (Sartre, et al) in denouncing the Soviet action.

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United States

28. The CPUSA has been in crisis ever since the first stories leaked out concerning the secret Khrushchev speech on Stalin, and the Hungarian events have aggravated the situation. The National Committee split over the first Soviet intervention in Hungary, with the majority, headed by Daily Worker editor John Gates, adopting a resolution condemning the Soviet action. The Gates faction, the views of which are expressed by most of the regular columnists of the Daily Worker, draws its main strength from the New York State Party organization, which counts for about 50% of the membership of the Party. National Chairman William Z. Foster, who has been on the defensive against what he calls the "liquidationist" program of the Gates faction, voted against the majority statements of 5 November, and in an article in the Daily Worker of 21 November sought to rationalize the Soviet action in Hungary. Party Secretary Eugene Dennis, while in disagreement with Foster in the past, supports the latter's position on Hungary. A National Committee letter to the Party members released on 19 November called the first Soviet intervention a "tragic error" and said that "divergent views" existed in the leadership over the intervention of 4 November. On 26 November an editorial in the Daily Worker challenged the right of the CPSU publication Kommunist to attack the Daily Worker's views as "babbling" and called upon the CPSU to publish the full text of the Daily Worker's statements. Daily Worker columnists have also defended Tito against the distortions in Pravda's attack on the Pula speech of 11 November.

Canada

29. Like the CPUSA, the Canadian CP (Labor Progressive Party) has been going through a serious crisis ever since the de-Stalinization process started. The Hungarian events have exacerbated this crisis, which has been manifested in protest letters to the Party weekly Canadian Tribune, resignations from the National Executive Committee (Harry Binder, National Treasurer of the LPP; and Norman Penner, Toronto organizer), the defection of six local leaders led by Gui Caron (Quebec Party leader), and the long dispute at the National Committee meeting that closed on 9 November. At this meeting Tim Buck managed to retain his control of the Party apparatus, and it seems likely that he will not lose it in the near future. In addition to this crisis in the leadership, the Hungarian and Jewish members of the Party's ethnic organizations are particularly disaffected.

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APPENDIX: Impact of Hungarian Crisis in
Various Countries Outside the
Communist Bloc

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ITALY

1. Popular Action.

Crowd of about 3500 attended Hungarian sympathy rally sponsored by 17 veterans' and student organizations 11 November. Over 5,000 troops and police cordoned off the area of CP Headquarters. Non-Communist trade unions took the offensive against Communist CGIL in a statement condemning Communist position in Hungary, refused to deal with CGIL in Turin shop councils.

Anti-Communist brawls in Catania.

Heavy police concentration in Perugia, 11 November, to prevent major conflict between Communists and anti-Communists at meeting addressed by Togliatti. The first peaceful demonstrations against Soviet action in Hungary became violent as result of neo-fascist and Communist activists' involvement.

2. Governmental Action.

Government leaders denounced Soviet action. Foreign Minister Martino sent a message to Nehru, calling upon him to take a firm stand on Soviet action in Hungary on the basis of the five Bandung principles.

The Government denied Suslov an entry visa to attend the PCI Congress, as a protest against Soviet action in Hungary.

3. Repercussions in Italian Communist Movement.

a. Resignations, expulsions, dissidence in CP.

- 1) Over-all membership loss, about 29%. Amendola report to CC, 15 January, cited issuance about 1,500,000 membership cards for 1957, as compared with 2,035,358 claimed membership for 1956.
- 2) Minor variations in losses from place to place, but percentage loss generally equally spread. Particularly hard hit in some

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areas of former strength. E.g.--

300 resignations in Genoa city and province between 25 October and 10 November. During the week 4 November, 3000 members reportedly resigned in Rovigo (total population: 14,600), a center of PCI strength. In Turin, a large portion (estimated at 61%) of the membership failed to renew their cards.

- 3) Anti-Soviet reaction particularly strong among intellectuals.
E. g.--

L'Unita Director Pietro Ingrao reported disillusioned; Il Paese and Paese Sera staff members sent letter to L'Unita protesting Party's defense of Soviet action; two editors of Paese Sera resigned.

Il Paese founder, Senator Tomaso Smith, who first resigned from the paper at the end of November, but who was persuaded to withdraw his resignation when the paper pledged that he would have "complete freedom of criticism," again resigned on 18 January 1957.

Mario Codignola, editor of Genoa L'Unita resigned from the paper and from the Party.

A group of six intellectuals announced their resignation from the Party on 1 January in a letter castigating the leadership for its failure to find an "autonomous road to Socialism." One of the six, Professor Vezio Crisafulli, professor of Constitutional Law at Trieste University, said that the group was disgusted by the PCI's "subservience to the Soviet regime." The other members of the group were Domenico Purificato, a painter; Leoncillo Leonardi, a sculptor; Claudio Longo, an architect; and writers Gaetano Trombatore and Natalino Sapegno. Another prominent Communist writer, Italo Calvino, announced that he subscribed to the views of this group. L'Unita refused to print his statement and said that he had been called up to explain his action to the Party Secretariat.

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- 4) Significant expressions of disaffection at 8th Party Congress, 8-14 December, continuing similar expressions in pre-Congress discussion, E.g.--

Carlo Salinari, managing editor of leading intellectual weekly, Il Contemporaneo, led Communist intellectual group in public protests and opposition against Party line, leadership, and Soviet action. At the Congress, Antonio Giolitti and Fausto Gullo led criticism and opposition. At the Congress Togliatti firmly rebuffed Di Vittorio's stand in favor of "depoliticization" of the CGL. Giolitti recanted.

- 5) The most significant dissident movement centers around former Senator Central Committee member, and representative at Cominform foundation Eugenio Reale. The PCI leadership felt it was safe to expel him only after it had gotten through the Congress. (He was prevented from attending the Congress, even as an observer.) Fabrizio Onofri, who engaged in hot public dispute prior to the Congress, is in the Reale group, as is Giolitti and Crisafulli (see above). Giolitti remained in the Party. The Communist Action group continues dissident activity, within and outside the Party.
- 6) Apathy and indifference in Party ranks. Extent of indifference particularly striking in Rome (reports of total lack of attendance at section meetings, etc.) because Rome is seat of Party headquarters.
- 7) In outlying areas whole sections have resigned en bloc, with most of the resignees applying for membership in the DC. E.g., in Vernole (Lecce), a Party Section secretary resigned, taking all his Section leaders with him.
- 8) Continued disagreement between Vidali and his Trieste Party on the one hand and PCI on the other, as well as within Trieste CP, over terms of incorporation. About 1/2 of Trieste CP opposes PCI line and advocates autonomy. This conflict aggravated by Tito problem.

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b. Loss of Popular Support; Troubles of PCI Press.

- 1) Heavy Communist losses in regional elections, Trentino-Alto Adige, reflect-- (1) loss of genuine mass support (paralleling losses in membership), as well as (2) decline of the negative "protest" vote.
- 2) Heavy set-backs for Communist candidates in factory elections in Northern Italy shortly after the Soviet action in Hungary. Communist candidates in the Michelin Rubber works shop stewards' election in Turin polled only 26.3% of the vote, as against 59.8% in 1955.
- 3) Decline in the circulation of Party press, and financial difficulties.
- 4) Loss of about 2% of the cooperatives.

c. Relations with PSI.

Hungarian events aggravated already existing differences between elements of the PCI and the PSI; encouraged anti-PCI tendencies to come out into the open. Lower levels of the PSI and PSI elements in the CGIL were particularly repelled by the Soviet action. It is estimated that Nenni, although attacking Soviet action, remains "neutralist" and basically anti-US and anti-NATO. His position appears to be essentially opportunist and reflects his current conviction that anti-Soviet sentiments can be profitably exploited to enhance the PSI potential as the major left party. He sees the PCI as having lost the possibility of ever getting power, but as retaining political significance which he will not irrevocably alienate. The PSI leadership would not want to write off PCI support if the PSI entered the government. Nenni's position vis-a-vis pro-PCI elements in the PSI Directorate will depend on (1) popular sentiment for socialist unification; (2) strength of the PSI leader faction that sees a chance to pull substantial numbers of PCI members into PSI; (3) success of dissident (Reale) elements in the PCI who are in contact with PSI elements (2, above); (4) extent to which a compromise formula can be

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worked out to satisfy pro-PCI faction in PSI Directorate and, at the same time, promote "socialist unification." A clearer picture may emerge at the PSI Congress, 7-11 February.

Meanwhile, Togliatti in 20 January 1957 Party anniversary speech in Milan, came out strongly against "socialist unification" at present on any basis that would compromise the PSI's position in the "class struggle." He said that the PCI would support any PSI leaders who would oppose such a unification with the PSDI. Togliatti's stand at Milan can be interpreted as--(1) a concession to the "hard" wing in the PCI; (2) an exercise of pressure on the PSI to ensure continued collaboration with the PCI; (3) a blackmail threat that he would engineer a split in the PSI.

FRANCE

1. Popular Action.

Anti-Communist action began in Paris; later spread throughout France. Student demonstration at Soviet Embassy 5 November. Crowd of about 3,000, mostly students, demonstrated at CP headquarters, where they smashed the steel shutters and tried unsuccessfully to smash bars and to enter building. Windows broken at Humanite offices. Socialist Party and Force Ouvriere called fifteen-minute work stoppage 7 November in honor of Hungarian martyrs. On 7 November crowd of about 10,000 demonstrated. Students led march on CP headquarters, broke in, set first two floors afire, threw furniture and documents into street. Firemen rescued some students held by the Communists and extinguished fire, but also threw furniture and documents into street. Students then broke into and sacked CP printing plant. Attempts to break into France-USSR building and to march on Soviet Embassy were thwarted by massive police barriers. Communist headquarters and newspaper plants sacked in Nice, Nimes, Nantes, Montpellier, Strasbourg, Caen, and Rennes. Smaller-scale anti-Communist demonstrations in Marseilles, Roanne, and Alençon.

Popular response to Hungarian relief drive has been tremendous, and the CP and its fronts have considered it advisable to launch their own independent drive.

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2. Governmental Action.

Assembly voted sympathy for Hungarians, calling on the Government to aid refugees and to seek means to prevent deportations. Vote was 436 to 148, with only Communists and Progressives opposed.

Center and Right politicians talked of banning the CP. Attempt by Tixier-Vignancourt to obtain ban in Assembly, 7 November, thwarted by parliamentary tactics. While interested in harassing the CP, many parties would not favor a ban on the CP. Some think that the CP will hang itself with its intransigent unpopular stand.

Communists claimed that the Prefect of the Seine Department banned a Communist "people's demonstration" against the "fascists" on 8 November.

The Paris municipal government ordered the flag flown at half mast on 5 November, in sympathy with the Hungarians.

3. Impact on French Communist Movement.

a. The CP apparatus in France, which has always been more tightly controlled and disciplined than that in Italy, has shown no outward signs of severe internal strain as a result of the Hungarian affair. The primary effects of Hungary on the French Communist movement have been observed on the periphery: among fellow-travelling and recently affiliated intellectuals, and in the structure of the Communist-controlled unions (CGT).

b. The intellectuals: a spectacular rebellion.

- 1) Leading Communists and fellow-travelling writers, members of the Communist front Comite National des Ecrivains (CNE), signed a public protest "against the use of cannon and tanks to break the revolt of the Hungarian people and its desire for independence." The group included Jean-Paul Sartre, Jacques Prevert, Claude Roy, Claude Morgan (Editor in chief of Communist weekly Les Lettres Francais), Jacques-Francis Rolland, Roger Vailland, J. Bruller ("Vercors") and Simon de Beauvoir.

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- 2) Rolland gave an interview to L'Express on 9 November charging that the bureaucrats of the PCF were stifling criticism.
- 3) Communist Professor Gerard Lyon-Caen of the Paris University Law School sent a letter to PCF headquarters upholding Roy, Vailland, Rolland, and Morgan, and deploring the suppression of the Hungarian uprising by force.
- 4) On 22 November Le Monde reported that the following Communist intellectuals had signed a letter protesting L'Humanite's failure to carry accurate news on international affairs, calling for a special Party Congress, and affirming their loyalty to the Party: painters Pablo Picasso and Edouard Pignon; writers Georges Besson, Francis Jourdain, Helene Parmelin, Paul Tillard; teachers Marcel Cornu, Henri Wallon and Renne Zazzo; and Dr. J Harel.

c. PCF counter-measures.

- 1) The Central Committee met three times in a five-week period during the crisis (18-19 October, 1 November, 20-21 November) Fajon, Garaudy, Billoux and Guyot laid down a rigidly pro-Soviet, anti-deviationist line. Servin, in L'Humanite of 12 November attacked the "termites and liquidators." The leadership would not "allow obscure little 'Petofi circles' to break up the Party," Servin declared. Guyot denounced the "opportunists and liquidators."
- 2) At the CC meeting of 20-21 November J F Rolland was expelled from the Party, Lyon-Caen was suspended for 6 months; Roy, Vailland, and Morgan were publicly reprimanded.
- 3) The Party press sought to divert attention from Hungary by concentrating on Egypt.
- 4) The staff of the weekly France Nouvelle has been thoroughly overhauled. Guyot told the Central Committee on 20-21 November that the publication had failed to fulfill its "decisive role in the ideological combat." Francois Billoux replaced Florimond Bonte as Director, beginning with the 1 December issue.

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d. Rank-and-file apathy and resignations.

Numerous reports indicate apathy on the part of rank-and-file Communists and some resignations from the Party, but no firm figures are available. France-Soir of 28 November said that "several hundred cases of open rebellion have occurred among the ranks of worker militants." Sartre has claimed that the Party has only about 180,000 members, but this figure is most probably much too low. It would appear that the formal membership has not fallen below 300,000, and even this figure does not afford a clear estimate of the losses suffered as a result of the East European crisis.

e. Set-backs in the labor field.

- 1) The CGT call for "a great day of union and action against Fascists" on 13 November was a fiasco everywhere. According to L'Express of 16 November several thousand CGT members answered this call by mailing torn-up membership cards to CGT headquarters. Only a relatively small number went out on strike. Many CGT units failed altogether to respond; some refused to transmit the strike order; some put in over-time work to raise funds for Hungarian relief.
- 2) A number of CGT federations and sections adopted resolutions condemning Soviet action in Hungary.
- 3) CGT candidates lost ground in several plant Comites d'Entreprise. In the elections at the Berliet factories, on 15 November the CGT dropped from 56.19% to 47.36% as against the 1955 elections. At the Ugine Steel plant at Chambery, the CGT lost control of the Committee for the first time since 1936. Other losses were recorded in the Nouvelles Messageries Parisiennes de Presse, the Societe Francaise de Materiel Agricole at Vierzon, the Dunlop Plant at Montlucon, and the Barrouin factory of the Compagnie des Ateliers et Forges de la Loire.
- 4) CGT leader Benoit Frachon admitted that "the CGT has been divided on the subject of Hungary" in a speech on 18 November. At a meeting of the CGT Bureau Confederal on 14 November, Pierre Le Brun and Jean Schaeffer reportedly attacked the

Soviet action in Hungary, and on 23-24 November Frachon said that the "differences" would be "swept away by the economic troubles which unfortunately are about to descend upon the working class."

f. Impact on other pro-Communist groups.

- 1) A group of 15 members of the National Council of the "Peace Movement" signed a petition calling for a special meeting to "define the position of the Peace Movement in Hungary" and regretting the "lack of clarity in the declarations of the Bureau concerning Hungary."
- 2) The Union Progressiste, which traditionally lines up with the PCF in the Assembly, has objected to the Soviet action in Hungary.
- 3) François Mauriac, Edouard Herriot, and others have resigned from the society France-URSS, and its vice-president, Dr. Weill-Halle, published an open letter in Le Monde of 14 November deploring the "tragedy" of Hungary, but stating that he had decided to postpone "temporarily" a decision as to whether to resign.

(Aime Cesaire, Communist leader in Martinique and member of the National Assembly, rebelled against the leadership of the PCF during the course of the East European crisis, but for reasons which appear not to have been directly connected with the crisis.)

AUSTRIA

1. Popular Action.

Popular reaction very strong. Socialist Youth staged silent parade 4 November before Soviet Embassy. Large crowd gathered at Embassy 7 November to demonstrate on the occasion of the October Revolution celebration. On 8 November crowd of about 5,000, mostly students, broke up poorly attended Communist rally and sacked every CP headquarters in Vienna as well as Communist book stores. Flag at Soviet Trade Mission burned. Over 3000 police unable to maintain order, but prevented demonstrators from entering Soviet Embassy.

Austrian Trade Union Federation protested Soviet actions in appeal addressed to WFTU, Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions, ICFTU, and IFCTU.

2. Governmental Action.

Communist newspaper Volksstimme for 4 November confiscated by State Prosecutor on charges of high treason, i. e., for claiming that Austria had violated neutrality in favor of Hungarian insurgents.

3. Repercussions in Austrian Communist Movement.

Austrian press reports that Central Committee members refused to endorse Party Chairman Koplenig's proposal to send greetings to Kadar, and walked out of a stormy CC meeting.

Majority of CC members rejected Koplenig's proposal to send October Revolution greetings to Moscow. Numerous officials have quit the Party. Considerable anti-Soviet sentiment in Styrian Party leadership, where Landtag Deputy and Graz municipal councilor Kramer heads the opposition. Kramer sent message to Graz Mayor condemning Soviet intervention in Hungary, demanding that the CP assert its independence, and that Stalinist CP leaders resign. Kramer later told a Styrian CP conference that he had no intention of resigning from the Party; that his declaration had aimed at giving "impetus to a speedy change of the policy of the Central Committee and to the speedy publication of principles concerning a specific Austrian road to Socialism, which avoids the grave errors of the Hungarian People's Democracy as regards hasty and sacrificing industrialization, the treatment of peasants and small business men, and particularly the violation of democracy."

Many Communist workers and shop stewards have quit the CP.

Press reports that the opposition in the KPOe leadership centers around Ernst Fischer, Bruno Frei, and Viktor Matejka, and that violent clashes occur at every Central Committee meeting. Communist press accounts of regional CP conferences confirmed existence of substantial friction. Some observers believe that the Party will soon split into Titoist and Muscovite groups. Fischer wrote (Volksstimme, 25 November), that "at no other time has any other event hurt us so deeply, nor has any event shaken our conscience so painfully as the Hungarian tragedy. Never before has there been a similar conflict between personal conscience and political consciousness, and never before was it so necessary for each one of us, and for the entire Party, to learn genuinely how to make Communism attractive again." He said that "it would be completely wrong to characterize the events in Hungary as a 'counterrevolutionary putsch.'"

Press reports defections have continued, including Communist art critic Johann Muschik; Dr. Ferdinand Warnig, city librarian and officer of Austro-Hungarian Society; Dr. Hertha Singer, a member of the staff of Der Abend; physicist Dr. Hans Gruemm; Johann Erliner, a labor leader in the Vienna electricity company; a large number of shop stewards in the metal workers' and miners' union. The Austro-Soviet Society issued a statement adopted 1 December admitting that its leadership does 'not agree in their views on the... /position/ of the Soviet Union in the recent events...'

Socialist press reports that the Association of Communist Policemen is split; that 50 members recently walked out on a CP spokesman who sought to defend the Soviet actions.

BELGIUM

1. Popular Action.

Non-Communist press and public opinion uniformly repelled by Soviet action in Hungary. About 2000 university students from Brussels and Louvain demonstrated at Soviet Embassy, 5 November. Antwerp dockers announced refusal to load Soviet ships.

2. Governmental Action.

Foreign Minister Spaak broadcast, 5 November, condemned Soviet action.

3. Repercussions in Belgian Communist Movement.

Press reports that CP leaders went into hiding after a demonstration outside Party headquarters, and that police did not know where they had set up headquarters. Reports of internal disagreements in Party leadership, but no large defections.

The Brussels press reported on 16 January 1957 that former Politburo member Albert Van Hoorick had resigned from the CP to join the Socialist Party, and this was confirmed by Le Drapeau Rouge Magazine No. 3 (19-25 January 1957). The Party has taken a "kid-gloves" attitude toward Van Hoorick and will probably continue to do so until, with Socialist encouragement and from the logic of events, he comes out publicly to attack the policies and leadership of the CP.

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DENMARK

1. Popular Action.

Following first use of Soviet troops, widespread and spontaneous drives for funds for Hungarian relief.

Observers report that Government and public reaction was stronger than to any other event since the war. Conservative Youth, Social Democrats, and trade unions promoted mass protest meetings.

Reaction to Soviet action of 4 November even stronger. Estimated 6-10,000 heard Student Joint Council condemn Soviet action, 4 November, Student and Socialist Youth groups tried to deliver protests to Soviet Embassy. Police obliged to show truncheons when 800 persons picketed CP newspaper office.

All flags at half-mast and five-minute work-stoppage and silence in memory of Hungary, 8 November. Church bells were rung throughout the five-minute period. Soviet Embassy reception boycotted. Two to three-thousand demonstrators stormed the Embassy, smashed windows, attempted to fire the building. Some demonstrators injured. Delegation exchanges with USSR halted. Danish CP cancelled its October Revolution celebration. Crowds broke windows and impeded delivery of CP newspaper.

National Organization of Liberal Youth condemned Soviet action and the WFDY. Other organizations adopted resolutions protesting the Soviet action.

2. Governmental Action.

Prime Minister protested Soviet action 4 November; gave Communist leader Aksel Larsen angry tongue-lashing in Folketing, where members heckled Larsen. Government Chef de Protocol spent only 5 minutes at Soviet Embassy reception, 7 November.

On 3 January 1957 the Government announced that the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to Denmark had been postponed indefinitely.

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3. Repercussions in Danish Communist Movement.

Serious disaffection among rank-and-file, among Communist and fellow-travelling intellectuals, and in mass organizations. Over-all membership loss estimated at 20%, but some local statistics suggest that this estimate may be too high. Disagreement and even opposition in Party leadership, reflected in Land og Folk articles that criticized the Soviet action, and in a shifting line taken towards the intellectuals. Party leader Aksel Larsen seems to have adopted a position that is not entirely in accord with the Soviet line on Hungary. In Land og Folk of 25 November, he said that the "consequences" of the Soviet aggression would be "serious." "In accordance with Socialist principles," Larsen wrote, "a people should be allowed to conduct its own affairs without foreign intervention. We know that the tragic events in Hungary did not occur without imperialist intervention, but Soviet tanks were and are more easily visible in Budapest than infiltration from the West." His article concluded by saying that the Party must "undertake independent evaluations of important problems without, with uncritical faith, approving of everything that happens in the Soviet Union." On 27 November, Land og Folk mildly criticized the Kadar Government for its handling of the Nagy disappearance.

A special Party Congress was called to open on 18 January, and may produce a show-down in the leadership. Other indications of losses include the following:

Communist fractions in two trade unions adopted resolutions 29 October protesting Soviet action. One group in Copenhagen tramway union threatened to resign from the CP if the latter failed to deliver a protest to the Soviet Ambassador. The other, in Elsinore shipyard union, voted funds for Hungarian aid. Shop stewards in Communist-influenced Elsinore shipyards condemned Soviet intervention, 2 November.

The son and a grandson of the late author Martin Anderson Nexoe, who was a show-piece of the CP, have resigned from the Party. Olaf Anderson Nexoe, the son, stated that he was resigning not "only on account of Hungary," but that he had "been planning to withdraw for some time."

Thirty-four intellectuals signed an "opposition statement" which was published in Information after Land og Folk refused to print it. Two of these were expelled on 16 November. The statement was finally

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carried on 21 December in a 4-page supplement to Land og Folk on the inner-Party discussion. In addition to the statement, the supplement carried pro-Soviet articles, but also an article by CC member Inger Merete Nordentoft sharply attacking the Soviet action in Hungary.

Front man Mogens Fog attacked the Party, and fellow-travelling writer H. C. Brauner has attacked the Soviet action.

Kaj Christiansen, one of three editors of Land og Folk, and five other staffers have quit their jobs (Jorgen Christensen, editorial writer; Anders Tyche and Egon Rasch of the editorial staff; Kaj Lund Hansen and Carl Dørge, press photographers).

Teit Kaern resigned from the Copenhagen City Council, but not from the Party. Carl Widriksen resigned from the Council and from the Party.

Folmar Bendtsen, Secretary of the Society for Cooperation between Denmark and the Soviet Union, cancelled his membership.

Defecting trade unionists include the following:

Poul Møller, shop steward in the Danish Aluminum Industry and a leader of the strikes in the spring of 1956.

Viggo Hansen, official of the Bookbinders Union.

Guldbaek Hansen, official of the Smiths union in Copenhagen.

Svend Laursen, chairman of Copenhagen Fuel Workers' Union.

Carl Petersen, vice-chairman of Section M of the Railway Workers' Union.

Gunnar Andersen, chairman of the Workers' Joint Organization in Vejle, Jutland.

Jørgen Ove Madsen, CP chairman and member of machine workers' union in Brønderslev, Jutland.

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FINLAND

1. Popular Action.

Student attempt to demonstrate at Soviet Embassy thwarted by police. Conservative Party delegation to Kekkonen 7 November protested abstention vote in UN, but non-Communist parties did not debate the issue in the Diet.

2. Governmental Action.

Government cautious. Police dispersed Helsinki students who gathered to march on Soviet Embassy 5 November. Government leaders decided to abstain UN vote on Hungary.

3. Repercussions in Finnish Communist Movement.

Tyokansan Sanamat took a firmly pro-Soviet line from the beginning of the Hungarian crisis, justifying the Soviet intervention and attacking the "Western imperialists." Social Democratic press, however, stated that considerable disagreement exists in the CP; that many Party members are critical of the Party's defense of Soviet action in Hungary; that some have called for the ouster for the Aaltonen leadership.

(WEST) GERMANY

Anti-Soviet crowd of 50-75,000 at Berlin Schoeneberg Rathaus 5 November. Student and youth groups, (8-10,000) marched on Soviet Sector. Some passed through police road-block to join more than 1,000 at Brandenburg Gate and Soviet War Memorial. Soviet Sector signs burned. Crowd stoned "Peoples Police" armored vehicles. Small youth group at Soviet War Memorial dissuaded from rushing Soviet Sector.

Some Berlin citizens advocated a global boycott of Soviet goods and strike against loading ships for Soviet ports.

About 2500, mostly Hamburg University students, paraded 5 November in protest against Soviet action in Hungary and Anglo-French action in Egypt. Broken up by police, smaller groups (600-800) demonstrated before French, British, U. S. Consulates General. Hamburg flags half-masted over Hungarian events.

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ICELAND

1. Popular Action.

Icelandic popular reaction against Soviet action in Hungary was unusually strong. Icelanders had not been so indignant since Russia invaded Finland in 1939.

Protest demonstrations at Soviet Embassy sponsored by non-Communist student and writers groups.

Communist-dominated Federation of Labor decision 2 November to collect funds for Hungarian relief viewed as defensive maneuver. The IFL failed to respond to an ICFTU request for a five-minute work stoppage, stating that request was not received in time. Despite opposition of Communist unions, five-minute protest work stoppage was widely observed 8 November in Reykjavik, Hafnarifjordur, and Akureyri.

Schools observed five-minute silence in sympathy with Hungarian people. Many foreign missions and all public buildings flew flags at half-staff.

Several hundreds gathered before Soviet Embassy, 7 November, and booed the few Icelanders attending October Revolution reception. Writer Halldor Laxness entered and left under police escort. Soviet flag torn down. Icelandic Foreign Minister placed in the embarrassing position of having to apologize to the Russians.

2. Governmental Action.

Hungarian events induce Government to cancel its request for withdrawal of US forces. Agreement over continuation of US bases made by notes exchanged 6 December.

Prime Minister condemned Soviet action in Hungary and Anglo-French action in Egypt in speech, 6 November.

Stormy session in lower house of Althing, 6 November, where Conservatives took the offensive. Communist speaker refused to recognize leader of Conservative Party who wanted to introduce

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resolution of sympathy. Social Democratic parliamentary group adopted resolution 6 November paralleling Government resolution.

3. Repercussions in Icelandic Communist Movement.

Internal dissension reported in CP Labor Alliance resolution, which included condemnation of Soviet aggression, adopted against opposition of 'Moscow wing'.

CP Council meeting, 25-28 November, paid relatively small attention to the defense issue--a marked departure from its recent policies. The Communist Society of Husivik on 28 November denounced the Soviet action in Hungary, and criticized the CPI leadership and the Party newspaper. The Society said that it would resign from the CP unless the leadership and the paper reversed their stand on the Hungarian crisis. [REDACTED] 25X1A2g

Petrina Jakobsson, member of Reykjavik City Council, member of Party Central Committee, and sister of defected Communist leader Aki Jakobsson, broke with the Party, particularly over its line on Hungary. Her son resigned from the Party at the same time.

In January 1957 trade union elections, Communists lost heavily (about 25%), except in the Party - controlled Dockworkers Union. Conservative candidates made definite gains in the Reykjavik Seamen's Union, the Hafnarfyordur Seamen's Union and the Throttur Truck Driver's Union.

Halldor Laxness in a 7 November interview in the CP paper Thjodviljinn showed clearly his own shock and disillusionment over events in Hungary.

LUXEMBOURG

Large crowd (estimated at 2,000), mostly students, wrecked Soviet Legation 6 November, destroying furnishings and two Soviet cars, and consuming or spoiling food and wine that had been prepared for October Revolution reception, for which no invited guests had appeared. Legation staff hid on top floor. Luxembourg army restored order.

Former Luxembourg prisoners of USSR planned to stage more serious demonstrations 7 November.

Prime Minister Bech, greatly upset by 6 November events, presented regrets to Soviet Minister and was staggered by the ruin of the Legation.

Víctor Ewen and Leon Thurm, Communist members of the city council of Esch s/Alzette (the major steel center and center of the left-wing in Luxembourg) resigned from the CP. Ewen also resigned from the Council.

Professor Pierre Biermann, whose house had been attacked during the demonstrations of 5-6 November, issued a statement on 15 November stating that he had resigned from the CP in August because he did not believe that Soviet policy was really being "de-Stalinized." Biermann had resigned from the presidency of the Luxembourg Peace Movement in 1953, and in his recent statement he said that it was because of constant CP interference.

NETHERLANDS

1. Popular Action.

Force of Anti-Soviet reaction unprecedented. Flags half-masted, press unanimous in attack on Soviets and Dutch CP. Demonstrations and attacks on Soviet Trade Mission and Embassy on CP Headquarters, bookstores, and offices of front organizations in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht. Crowd of 5-6000 attacked CP offices in Amsterdam 4 November. Soviet representatives, Communist leaders and families molested. Soviet families moved into Embassy or Trade Mission, which were put under heavy police guard. Rotterdam dockers refused to work on Soviet ships and Dutch firms have boycotted Soviet business. Public attempted to prevent distribution of CP newspaper which endorsed Soviet line on Hungary. Kurhaus hotel at Scheveningen cancelled Soviet reception 7 November. Thousands of Amsterdam students hung Zhukov in effigy 5 November. Dutch-Soviet soccer match cancelled. Many organizations have pressed for severance of diplomatic relations with USSR. Dutch team withdraws from Olympic Games, donates funds to Hungarian relief. Many advertizers cancel contracts with CP newspaper. The CP publishing firm has lost many of its private printing contracts and many of its employees have been laid off.

2. Governmental Action.

Prime Minister Drees forestalls attempt of several political parties to break diplomatic relations with USSR on the ground that it would hurt the Netherlands, but he said that his Government was prepared to cancel cultural and athletic exchanges.

3. Repercussions in Dutch Communist Movement.

Substantial defections from Communist trade union central (EVC), Resignations of a number of locally prominent Party members, including members of municipal councils. Many subscriptions to CP newspaper De Waarheid cancelled. Hard core of CP maintained its rigid position.

Some Communist intellectuals signed a protest statement against the Soviet action and were rather mildly criticized by Marcus Bakker in De Waarheid (16 Nov. 1956).

NORWAY

1. Popular Action.

Strong popular reaction against Soviet action in Hungary. Flags at half-mast; Storting stood in respect for Hungarian dead; Oslo University President expressed sympathy for the Hungarians. Trade unions recalled delegations in USSR. Youth and students demanded cessation of delegations to USSR. Almost complete boycott of Soviet Embassy 7 November celebration. Numerous trade unions and other organizations demanded withdrawal of Soviet troops. Largest mass meeting since 1945 assembled for fund-raising campaign for Hungary, 6 November (estimated 7,000 persons). About 1-2000 then joined in demonstration at Soviet Embassy; slight disturbances (bottles, stones, one stink-bomb thrown). David Oistrakh concert and meeting of Norwegian-Soviet Friendship Society cancelled. Norwegian Cooperative Association delegation to USSR cancelled. Norwegian shipowners refused Soviet shipping, pending clarification of international situation. Demands for cancellation of Bulganin-Khrushchev visit next spring.

2. Governmental Action.

Prime Minister and Foreign Minister denounced Soviet action. Government recalled two Norwegian labor delegations traveling in USSR, 5 November. Labor Party cancelled visit of Soviet editors' delegation 5 November.

3. Repercussions in Norwegian Communist Movement.

Drammen District CP leader resigned; hoped to join the Labor Party, taking some Communists with him. Prominent Communist youth leader in Kristiansund defected. Division reported in CP between leaders and trade unionists and sizeable defections have been reported from Norwegian-Soviet Friendship Society. Despite these defections, as well as a few other resignations of locally prominent leaders (Lauritz Nygard, Egersund municipal council member) there have been no mass resignations from the Party itself.

On 9 November, CP Chairman Emil Løvlien declared in Parliament that the Soviet action could not be defended. The CP published a statement on 11 November calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from all countries, including Hungary. The statement also supported the admission of UN observers into Hungary as a preliminary step to the withdrawal of Soviet forces. The NKP informed the Hungarian Labor Party, the CPSU and other Communist Parties of its views. This statement was endorsed by a national Party conference on 24-25 November, as was Løvlien's statement. Friheten also criticized the abduction of Nagy.

The State Youth Council, representing fifty-nine Norwegian youth organizations, including the Communists, rejected a Soviet proposal for extensive cooperation, in protest against Soviet action in Hungary.

SWEDEN

1. Popular Action.

Reaction against Soviet action in Hungary described as unparalleled. Condemnation from all sectors: Conservatives, Liberals, Agrarians and Social Democrats. Student-labor demonstrations in all university towns. 4000 Stockholm students rioted in front of Soviet Embassy and 10,000 marched through streets. Soviet Embassy reception 7 November poorly attended, but no major demonstration. Heavy contributions for Hungarian relief.

Swedish trade union federation, LO, condemned Soviet action.

2. Governmental Action.

Speakers of both houses of the Riksdag broadcast condemnation of Soviet action. Foreign Minister spent only five minutes at Soviet Embassy reception, 7 November.

Government refused visas for Soviet Bloc delegates to attend World Peace Council meeting scheduled to take place in Stockholm, mid-November.

3. Repercussions in Swedish Communist Movement.

Non-Communist press claims that the Communist "friendship" and "peace" movements have lost heavily in popular support as a result of Soviet action; that Communist leaders in the cultural and "friendship" movement in Gothenburg have quit.

According to Ny Dag, of 10 November the Party leadership, in discussing the Egyptian and Hungarian developments, stated that " 'changes in a country's internal affairs must be made in accordance with the people's will and not forced on them by interventions from outside.' The Party thus aligns itself with the principle of non-intervention and that 'no country should try to influence or intervene in the internal developments in any other country with troops or any other means.' " The CP adopted the line that had been taken by the Norwegian and Danish CP's in calling for withdrawal of all foreign forces from Europe. Closing its statement, the Party expressed itself for "complete democratization, peace, and national sovereignty for Hungary."

Subsequently, however, according to a Moscow TASS account (10 January 1957) the CP has adopted the firmly pro-Soviet position that "in the Hungarian events... the main part was played by U. S. imperialism and the internal reaction."

Locally prominent Communists, Börje Fransen (Dalsland) and Olle Karlsson (Stockholm) have resigned. Dissident "Stalinist" Set Persson has increased his activities.

SWITZERLAND

1. Popular Action.

Strong popular and press reaction against Soviet action. Groups in Bern demonstrated before the Soviet Embassy and collected signatures for anti-Soviet petition, 4 November. Helvetic Society (patriot group) and Bern youth organization called for mass demonstration, 5 November.

Pro-Hungarian demonstration, Zurich, 10 November. Socialist Party called on Federal Council to deny recognition to

"Quisling Hungarian Government."

Citizens and hotels gave free lodging to Hungarian refugees.

Large anti-Soviet demonstration, Geneva, 7 November. CP newspaper office damaged. Police used fire hoses and tear gas to disperse demonstrators and prevent disturbances of Soviet October Revolution reception.

2. Governmental Action.

Federal Council participated in relief for Hungarians. Government agreed to accept 2,000 Hungarian refugees.

3. Repercussions in Swiss Communist Movement.

Party leader J. Vincent, in Vorwaerts 14 and 15 November, acknowledged that serious damage had been done to its CP by the Hungarian crisis.

Numerous resignations from CP. Basel and Zurich report greatest number of defections. French-speaking Switzerland CP less affected. Editor of Basel CP newspaper Vorwaerts Ulrich Kaegi resigned. Three party sections near Basel resigned en bloc and now operate independently. Basel Communist youth organization objected to "swallowing everything" that the Soviets say. Leading defectors include Peter Stein, Fritz Heeb, Adolf Haesler, Dr. Primo Medice, Dr. Martin Stohler, Jean Moser, Hans Kugler, Gottfried Baumann, Willy Grieder, Eugen Grise, Gerhard Lehman, Georges Perrenoud, Paul Camenisch and Otto Schudel. Many of these were members of Basel and Zurich local governments. Renowned painter and fellow traveler Hans Erni denounced the Soviet action.

On 15 December, it was announced that publication of Vorwaerts would be reduced from six times a week to once a week because of financial difficulties.

UNITED KINGDOM

Popular Action.

British Trade Union Congress (TUC) General Council decided 28 November to recommend against any further exchange delegations

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with Soviet Union in protest against Soviet action in Hungary; voted 15,000 Pounds Sterling in addition to initial 10,000 for Hungarian relief; but decided against international boycott of USSR on practical grounds and because it opposes industrial action for political ends.

Crowd of 200 students chased Party Secretary Gollan through the streets of Cowes, Isle of Wight, after he quit a meeting at which he was to speak on Hungary and Poland.

Repercussions in British Communist Movement.

"Hundreds" of resignations from the CP by trade unionists and intellectuals, including John Horner (General Secretary, Fire Brigade Union), A. Wallis (Yorkshire official of Electrical Trades Union), Alex Moffat (Scottish Mineworkers Union), Jack Grahl, Leo Keeley, and T. Parry (Officials, Fire Brigade Union); Leslie Cannon (a leader of Electrical Trades Union), Professors Edward Thompson and John Saville (editors of The Reasoner, anti-leadership Communist publication), "Gabriel" (James Friell) (Chief cartoonist, London Daily Worker). Richard Seabrook (East Anglian organiser of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers), Fred Moore (London organiser of the Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers), David Ross (Secretary, Gateshead branch of Amalgamated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen); leaders of CP local organizations, Arthur Fullard (Sheffield), Maurice Graham (Hainault, Essex), James Crooks (Ashington, Northumberland).

Other Daily Worker staff members Patrick Goldring (film critic), Malcolm MacEwen, (features editor) and Llew Gardner (staff reporter) also quit the paper. Except for Goldring, these staffers did not quit the CP.

Cannon, Grahl, and Keeley issued statement calling for dissolution of the CP. Daily Worker correspondent Peter Fryer resigned from the paper, but not from the CP, because it refused to publish his stories from Hungary, Oxford University branch of the CP disbands in reaction to Hungary. Recent meeting of Young Communist League sees "a revival of Trotskyite policies and outspoken refusal to subscribe to Soviet brutalities."

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London Daily Worker claims that only a "tiny few... are reconsidering their membership" (London, Reuters, 14 November); but letters critical of Soviet action have appeared in the paper, and the Party has called a special Congress for next Easter. On a television program, 10 December, Gollan admitted that 590 persons had resigned and predicted a 3 per-cent total loss. He failed to mention that these defections included most of the Party's thoughtful members and almost all of its outstanding intellectuals.

On 1 January 1957 the Daily Worker said that it was faced with a possible closing down because of rising costs and loss of circulation. The circulation loss was said to be due to "some readers' disagreement with our policy on Hungary."

Peter Fryer, the Daily Worker correspondent in Budapest who resigned from that paper, gave an interview to the London Daily Express setting forth his reasons: his stories had been censored and/or suppressed by the Daily Worker; he knew that Soviet troops had committed excesses in Hungary; he knew that the uprising was supported by "99 per-cent of the people, including a great number of the ordinary honest rank-and-file members of the Communist Party", and that there was "no 'white terror' ". He called the Soviet action "brutal, criminal, and totally unnecessary." He has just published a book, "The Hungarian Tragedy."

The factional Communist publication The Reasoner (edited by John Saville and E. P. Thompson) put out its final November number with an appeal for CP members to "dissociate themselves completely from the leadership of the British Communist Party" and to maintain contacts. The editors promised to try to establish a "new Socialist journal." Saville and Thompson were suspended from the CP for three months.

ARGENTINA

1. Popular Action.

Pro-Hungarian demonstration near Soviet Embassy, 7 November, lasting several hours and becoming violent. Crowd estimated at 500. Soviet Embassy stoned. Police obliged to use tear gas and vehicle and horse charges. Catholic students clashed with Communists at Rosario. CP office set on fire and several persons wounded.

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Poor attendance at Soviet Embassy reception celebrating October Revolution.

Soviet flag torn down from UN office.

2. Governmental Action.

Ministry of Interior banned all meetings of the CP and its affiliates.

Argentine Court ruled that the CP cannot present political candidates for elections. Hungarian events cited in judgement that CP is tied to international totalitarian movement and therefore not democratic.

Police raided CP District Headquarters in Buenos Aires; arrested 15-20 Communists. Two police killed in gunfire.

Government protested Soviet action.

BOLIVIA

Chamber of Deputies adopted resolution 7 November condemning Anglo-French action in Egypt and Soviet action in Poland and Hungary.

The first strong defense of the Soviet action in the unofficial CP newspaper El Pueblo did not appear until 27 November.

BRAZIL

Minor demonstrations of sympathy with Hungary. Intellectual leaders failed to develop vigorous indignation over Soviet action.

In early stages of Hungarian crisis some articles appeared in CP's Imprensa Popular, expressing the view that the uprising had genuine popular roots and was not the exclusive product of "imperialist, fascist reaction." These were soon followed by strictly pro-Soviet articles. In a letter published on 29 November, Party leader Prestes cracked down on loose discussion, called for "iron discipline" and "proletarian internationalism" in support of the CPSU, "the bulwork of world socialism." The Central Committee fully endorsed the Prestes letter in a resolution published on 25 November.

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CHILE

Meeting sponsored by Hungarians and Poles protesting Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe, 31 October. Various left-wing and liberal organizations issued statements condemning Soviet action in Hungary. Liberal Party resolution 30 October expressed solidarity with Hungarian people in struggle for independence. Radical Senator Isauro Torres made speech on behalf of his party 20 November, saying, "We, the Radicals, do not reject the doctrine of Communism, but we refuse to accept the diabolic use of Communist dogma to satisfy the imperialist designs of Moscow."

CP issued statement supporting Soviet action in Hungary, following a period of internal confusion.

The Directive Council of the strongly Communist labor central, CUTCH, was split when a resolution was adopted 20 November protesting Soviet action in Hungary.

Poet Pablo Neruda rejected an appeal from Congress of Cultural Freedom to join Sartre in repudiating Soviet action.

COLOMBIA

Unconfirmed report of serious confusion within the CP over Hungarian events.

COSTA RICA

1. Popular Action.

Unusually strong public condemnation of Soviet actions in Hungary. Large number of anti-Soviet newspaper editorials. Estimated 2,000 secondary school students and others participated in demonstrations and mass for Hungarian patriots, 19 November.

2. Governmental Action

National Assembly resolution adopted 1 November expressing sympathy for Hungarian people.

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3. Repercussions in Costa Rican Communist Movement.

Confusion in CP leadership over Hungarian events outwardly resolved by the decisive Soviet action on 4 November. Official Party statement published 11 November in Adelante, fully supporting Soviet line that "imperialists" were behind Hungarian revolt. Nevertheless, reports of disorientation in the leadership persisted through December. Professor Corina Rodriguez, a pro-Communist leader of women's activities, completely renounced her sympathies for the USSR on 16 November.

CUBA

Non-Communist press condemned Anglo-French action in Egypt and Soviet action in Hungary.

PSP circular dated 26 October blamed Hungarian troubles on U. S. "imperialists."

PSP publications following second Soviet intervention of 4 November continued firmly pro-Soviet line.

ECUADOR

President Ponce said in a press interview that the UN police force should go to Hungary as well as Egypt "to restore the dignity and sovereignty of Hungary," and offered 500 Ecuadorian troops. He condemned the "Russian massacre of the Hungarian people," and sent a telegram to European Governments-in-exile expressing "moral solidarity" against Soviet action. The Government offered asylum for the Hungarian refugees.

In addition to other signs of growing revulsion of Quito University students against Soviet action, the Ecuadorian University Students Federation, an affiliate of the international Communist students' front, IUS, adopted a resolution condemning Soviet action in Hungary and calling on the IUS to "clarify" its position on the Hungarian situation. This resolution apparently was the result of pressure from below in the FEUE. Worker reaction against the USSR has given the Communists a set-back in organized labor.

On 10 November the CP daily El Siglo justified the Soviet action.

GUATEMALA

Estimated 15-20,000 participate in parade and demonstration, 6 November, in protest against Soviet action in Hungary.

MEXICO

PCM leaders reported as confused by anti-Soviet actions in Poland and Hungary in October, although the Party press carried numerous articles and editorials defending the USSR. As of the end of November PCM leader Dionisio Encina had still not made any personal statement on the crisis. The strongest early defense of the USSR was made by Vicente Lombardo Toledano, head of the pro-Communist Partido Popular, who gave a lecture on 31 October, taking a rigidly pro-Soviet position and attacking the "lies" in the "capitalist" press concerning the first Soviet intervention in Hungary.

PERU

General popular reaction against Soviet action in Hungary, distracted somewhat by opposition against Anglo-French action in Egypt. Most Congressmen and the major daily newspapers expressed sympathy for Hungarian people. Even the Aprista publication Impacto sharply criticized Soviet propaganda.

URUGUAY

Immigrant workers from Satellite countries and 300 students demonstrated 7 November; set fire to and seriously damaged the Soviet Consulate. Large student demonstration at Soviet Legation. Legation guests and police stoned. Students heckled Communist October Revolution celebration; mounted police required to prevent major clash. Students attacked CP headquarters with fire bombs.

The Senate voted unanimously on 22 November to send to the Ministry of Foreign Relations the transcript of its debate in which numerous speakers attacked the USSR. Several Senators proposed taking sanctions against the USSR. Uruguayan UN delegation instructed to vote against seating of Kadar delegate.

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Communist trade union activity seriously, if only momentarily, set back by Soviet action in Hungary. The CSU (Socialist-influenced, but apolitical labor central) Congress in special session on 17 November decided against joining the Coordinating Committee of the so-called Central Union of Workers, a Communist (UGT) sponsored organization.

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